The Washington Dilemma: A Historical Challenge for Liberian Presidents with Devastating Consequences
Attempting to stay clear of Washington due to its controversial approach to Liberian relations is an old playbook. No president of the West African nation has ever survived the dilemma without caving into Washington or suffering consequences since the creation of the state, but it has been more intrusive during the Second Republic. From William R. Tolbert’s “Mat to Mattress” policy to Charles G. Taylor’s “VISION 2024,” the outcomes have impacted the presidency and the stability of the Liberian nation-state — with far-reaching consequences. Any rational analysis will come to this logical conclusion — except one blinded by hypocrisy or cowardice: Liberia-Washington relations require re-evaluation, with the goal of creating a new engagement model, as cutting ties isn’t an option, and the two remain asymmetrically interdependent.
Joseph Boakai is not the first president to show signs of growing weary or to explore alliances with countries that have competing economic and geopolitical interests with Washington. China, Russia, and the former USSR have been on the horizon to exploit any kink in Liberia-Washington relations. William R. Tolbert, Samuel K. Doe, and Charles G. Taylor took the same path, with similarly catastrophic results. Recent whispers from sources close to Boakai suggest that he believes Washington will not provide substantial support for the success of his government, prompting his gradual shift toward China. But this is suicidal and may only be overlooked by those who have paid little or no attention to U.S.-Liberia relations over the last few decades. Pages 243–247 of the Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final report shed light on this.
Since its founding, Liberia has always been solely influenced by Washington for economic, military, and geopolitical reasons. The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), National Security Agency (NSA), ship registry (Maritime), and the extractive sector have all been heavily influenced by this relationship. For example, when Great Britain was positioned to monopolize rubber production, Firestone’s establishment in Liberia in 1926 effectively ended that dominance. Projects like the building of the Omega tower and Roberts International Airport, among others, were all infrastructural undertakings championed by Washington for military operations to secure a foothold in Africa and beyond.
Unlike Boakai, William R. Tolbert led a country with an economy with stronger fundamentals. He believed that making the country self-reliant on food and addressing other bread-and-butter issues would improve the lives of the people. In addition, Tolbert was a strong advocate for African unity and stood firmly against neo-colonialism. He believed these were the right actions to take, and his policies began to reflect the changes and values he sought. This angered Washington, and the Progessive Alliance Of Liberia (PAL), headed by Baccus Matthews, received some form of endorsement, leading to the 1979 rice riots and, subsequently, the 1980 coup. Tolbert’s major crime was re-evaluating policies and pushing for actions that would have benefited the common people.
For both Doe and Taylor, they rose to power by the sword and were ousted by it. Their leaderships were marred by a lack of foresight and depth. Doe, largely uneducated, surrounded himself with individuals who lacked forward thinking, which only deepened the divisions within the country. His adversarial stance against Washington came after he had already divided the country along tribal lines. Taylor, on the other hand, was a pale imitation of Tolbert, mimicking his style of leadership, right down to his mannerisms and rhetoric. Even before becoming president, Taylor’s friction with the West was evident. His refusal to take orders from Washington — something he openly admitted in one of his interviews — only justified his downfall. His inability to craft an independent yet pragmatic foreign policy, coupled with his defiance, made him an inevitable target for failure.
Now it is Boakai’s turn, after succeeding two immediate predecessors, Weah and Sirleaf, who did all they could to avoid direct confrontation with Washington. However, in his last days, some of Weah’s core officials were sanctioned over the High-Power Exploration (HPX) and ArcelorMittal controversial deal. HPX is a Washington-backed company. This happened because Weah didn’t have any strong insider in Washington to promote his interests. But both Weah and Sirleaf did all they could to stay on the right side of Washington, unlike Boakai, who is growing weary so early. This gradual shift has reportedly extended to negotiating deals with companies like Huawei and SUMEC Technology — both of which are blacklisted by Washington. These deals, one of which mentioned 3 billion, may sound appealing but will be clear defiance to Washington and enough justification for potential strikes.
Washington is a tricky mix of friend and foe —hard to keep too close but just as hard to push way. For Liberian presidents, navigating this complex relationship requires a critical balance between cooperation and independence. Relying too much risks biting off more than you can chew, but pulling away too far could lead to diplomatic, political and economic backlash. The key challenge lies in managing their unpredictability, which can shift between support and pressure depending on its geopolitical interests.
